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Abstract Innocent victims of crime are often blamed for what happened to them.
In this article, we examine the hypothesis that victim blaming can be significantly
reduced when people mimic the behavior of the victim or even a person unrelated to
the crime. Participants watched a person on a video after which we assessed the
extent of their spontaneous mimicry reactions (Study 1) or participants were
instructed to mimic or not to mimic the movements of this person (Study 2). Then,
they were informed about a rape and criminal assault and judged the degree to
which they thought the victims were responsible for the crime. One of the crimes
happened to the same person as the person they previously did or did not mimic.
The other crime happened to a person unrelated to the mimicry situation. Results of
both studies revealed that previously mimicking the victim or an unrelated person
reduced the degree to which victims were being blamed.
Keywords Mimicry  Victim blaming  Nonverbal behavior  Imitation  Judgment
Introduction
On a hot summer night, Susan is walking home from a night out with her friends.
Suddenly, a man jumps out of the bushes and grabs her. He pulls up Susan’s’ skirt
and starts to rape her. Quite often when people read about these sorts of terrible
events, they tend to ask whether the victim and his/her behavior could be (partly)
responsible for what had happened. For example, was Susan asking for this to
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happen as she was walking alone and wearing a short skirt? In this article, we show
that mimicry (i.e., imitating other individuals’ behaviors) leads people to attribute
less responsibility to the innocent victims for what happened.
Victim Blaming
Innocent victims of rape or other crimes fear the reactions of other people and often
have to prove they were not to blame for what had happened to them (Brown &
Testa, 2008). Although people often tend to empathize and react sympathetically to
another person’s pain or distress (e.g., Berger, 1962; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety,
2005), victims of crimes are often rejected and devaluated (e.g., Correia, Vala, &
Aguiar, 2007; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Moreover, innocent victims are often held
entirely or at least partly responsible for what happened to them. We refer to this
process as victim blaming (e.g., Lerner, 1965).
Why do people react by blaming the victim instead of empathizing with the
innocent victim? Just world theory by Lerner and others proposes that people tend to
blame innocent victims because people have a basic need to believe that the world is
just (Lerner, 1980). In other words, they need to believe that good things happen to
good people and bad things happen to bad people. This belief protects them from the
view that something bad could happen to them: Accepting a situation in which a
person is unfairly treated means that they themselves are unsafe and at risk. In other
words, innocent victims threaten people’s belief that the world is just (Hafer, 2000).
Therefore, people’s reactions to victims of crime can be such that the victim must
have done ‘‘something’’ to deserve their fate (Lerner, 1980).
Victim blaming can be reduced when observers empathize with the victim. For
instance, Aderman, Brehm, and Katz (1974) showed that victims were rated less
negatively when observers were instructed to think about how they themselves
would feel when being in the victims’ situation. Thus, empathy seems to reduce that
people act in accordance with their belief in a just world. In this article, we build on
this established insight by using mimicry, a mechanism which has been shown to
enhance empathy (see, e.g., Stel, Van Baaren, & Vonk, 2008; Van Baaren, Holland,
Kawakami, & Van Knippenberg, 2004). Thus, firmly grounding our work in these
established findings we propose that copying the behaviors of other people should
reduce the extent to which victims are being blamed. We further note that because
people continuously mimic each other’s behaviors in everyday life (e.g., Cheng &
Chartrand, 2003), it is important to investigate whether mimicry and victim blaming
indeed are related. Before elaborating more on why mimicry may be related to
victim blaming, we will first give a short introduction of the mimicry concept.
Mimicry and Victim Blaming
Evidence for the existence of mimicry shows that we nonconsciously mimic other
peoples’ behaviors, postures, gestures, mannerisms, words, accents, speech rates,
and facial expressions (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Dimberg, 1990). Mimicry
influences our thoughts, behaviors, judgments, and decisions of everyday life. One
of the consequences of mimicking and of being mimicked is that it makes people
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more empathic and helpful to others (Stel et al., 2008; Van Baaren et al., 2004). For
instance, Stel et al. (2008) demonstrated that when an individual acts in the same
way as another person does, the mimicker can easily take the perspective of the
other person and become more emotionally attuned to the other person.
Integrating the literature of mimicry and victim blaming, it can be expected that
mimicry can serve as a means to reduce victim blaming. First, as outlined above,
mimicry research shows that mimicry makes people more empathic toward others
(Stel et al., 2008; Van Baaren et al., 2004). Second, victim blaming research, as
noted earlier, demonstrated that empathy for the victim reduced the negative
reactions toward victims (Aderman et al., 1974). Combining these insights one
would expect that mimicry and victim blaming are related. If this assumption would
be valid then it should be the case that mimicry leads to less victim blaming. In this
article, we test the expectation that victim blaming can indeed be reduced by
mimicry.
Moreover, we examine whether mimicry should be directed at the victim for the
possible effects on victim blaming to occur or whether engaging in mimicry,
regardless whether the object of mimicry is the victim or another person, causes the
effects. Obtaining evidence for the latter process would imply that mimicry effects
on victim blaming are not influenced by feelings for a specific victim, but are caused
by a general empathic mindset. In fact, previous mimicry research is indicative that
such a general empathic mindset exists. For example, it has been demonstrated that
mimicking and being mimicked not only affect empathy to the persons related to the
mimicry situation, but also to other people in general (Ashton-James, Van Baaren,
Chartrand, Decety, & Karremans, 2007; Stel et al., 2008; Van Baaren et al., 2004).
Furthermore, Van Baaren et al. (2004) argued that mimicry creates closeness with
others which may induce a greater focus on others in general and makes people
more empathic toward other people in general. Therefore, we expect that effects of
mimicry on judgments of victim blame will occur even when the victim is unrelated
to the previous mimicry situation.
The Current Research
To investigate the effect of mimicry on blaming victims, we conducted two studies
in which the amount of mimicry was measured (Study 1) or experimentally varied
(Study 2). In Study 1, we measured participants’ spontaneous mimicry reactions to a
person who was shown on a video. In Study 2, we asked participants to either mimic
or not mimic the person who was shown on a video. Then, all participants read two
scenarios describing situations in which a person had been raped or assaulted. One
victim was the same person they previously observed on the video. Another victim
was a person unrelated to the mimicry situation. We assessed participants’ reactions
to the victims by asking to what extent victims could be held responsible for what
had happened to them. In addition, we assessed participants’ reactions to
perpetrators. This allowed us to explore whether mimicry affects perpetrator
blaming.





Participants were 15 students at Utrecht University (11 women and 4 men, mean
age: 21.47 years, range: 19–27 years). They participated for payment (€3) or course
credits. Our independent variable was the amount of mimicry participants’
spontaneously showed when watching a video of a person. The dependent variables
were the degree to which participants blamed a victim and perpetrator for the crime.
Procedure
In the first part of the study, we measured the amount of spontaneous mimicry; in
the second part, we measured the degree to which participants blamed victims and
their perpetrators. First, participants were informed they there were about to watch
a video fragment of another student who talked about studying Art History. This
student described her activities, what she liked and did not like about these
activities, and what she had learned during this period. In the video, her head and
part of shoulders were visible. While talking, she naturally moved her eyes,
eyebrows, lips, mouth, and head. To measure the amount of mimicry participants
spontaneously engaged in, participants’ nonverbal reactions were unobtrusively
being taped while watching the video. Participants were informed that they would
be asked questions about the video fragment in a later stage.
In the second part of the experiment participants were informed that they would
be judging a specific situation. They read brief descriptions of four characters, two
men and two women. These descriptions informed our participants about what
majors the stimulus persons were studying and what they liked to do in their free
time. In the description of one of the female characters, participants were told that
this stimulus person was the same student whom they previously watched in the
video. Then, they read two scenarios about a person being raped and about a
person being sexually assaulted by one of the male characters. Two types of crime
were used to enhance generalizability. The same scenarios were used as in Bal and
Van den Bos (2010, Study1). One of the scenarios was about the person they
previously watched in the video; the other scenario was about a person unrelated
to the person on the video. The order of crime type (rape or assault first) and the
order of the person described in the scenarios (related or unrelated person first)
was counterbalanced. Please note that the person on the video was a student
talking about her study and was not talking about being involved in any crime.
Only in the second part of the experiment, we described either in the first or in the
second scenario that this same person was involved in a crime or that another
person was involved in a crime.
After being informed about each crime, participants filled out a questionnaire
measuring the degree to which they blamed the victim and perpetrator. Victim
blaming was measured with nine items used in Bal and Van den Bos (2010) (e.g., ‘‘I
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think she acted irresponsibly considering the situation she was in’’, a = .78).
Perpetrator blaming was measured with three items (e.g., ‘‘I think that he acted the
way he did, due to the person he is’’, a = .69). All items were measured on seven-
point scales (1 = certainly do not agree, 7 = certainly do agree). At the end of the
questionnaire, demographic variables were assessed. All participants were asked
if they knew what the experiment was about. None of them reported anything
related to the actual goals of our study. Afterward participants were thanked and
debriefed.
Results
Type of crime, order of crime type, and order of the described person did not yield
significant effects and thus analyses were collapsed across these variables. The
procedure of previous studies was followed to calculate mimicry (see Stel, Van Dijk,
& Olivier, 2009; Stel et al., 2008). Two trained coders rated the movements of all
participants and compared these to the coded movements of the target person of the
video (interreliability = 0.96). The participants and target were coded independently.
First, the target was coded: the observed movements were movements of eyes,
eyebrows, lips, mouth, and head. Then, the movements of the participants were
observed and matched with the target’s movements using a time limit of 10 s. A
participants’ movement was scored as mimicry if it matched the movement of the
target and occurred after that movement within the time limit. Thus, if one of the
targets’ observed movements in of eyes, eyebrows, lips, mouth, and head at a certain
time were also shown by the participant after the targets movement and within the
time limit, the participants’ movement was scored as mimicry. Participants’
spontaneous mimicry level ranged in between 0 and 50% out of all the behaviors
shown by participant (overall M = 30.47, SD = 13.27).
Related Victim
We conducted a regression analysis in which the predictor was the percentage of
mimicry (i.e., the number of mimicked movements divided by the total number of
movements displayed by the participant) and the dependent variable was the degree
to which participants blamed the victim whom they previously watched on the
video. This reveals that the more participants engaged in spontaneous mimicking of
the victim, the less this victim was blamed for the crime, b = -.55, t = -2.40,
p = .03, R2 = .31.
Unrelated Victim
A regression analysis for the unrelated victim showed that spontaneous mimicry
predicted the degree of victim blaming in the same way: The more participants
spontaneously mimicked a person displayed on a video who was not involved in any
crime, the less they blamed an unrelated victim for the crime she felt victim to,
b = -.51, t = -2.15, p = .05, R2 = .26.
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Perpetrator Blame
Regression analyses for the perpetrator of the person on the video and the
perpetrator of an unrelated person showed that mimicry did not significantly predict
the degree to which participants blamed these perpetrators for their crimes, b =
-.016, respectively, b = -.006, ts \ 1, R2s \ .05.
Discussion
In line with our hypotheses, the results showed that the amount of spontaneous
mimicry reactions to a person influenced the degree to which this person was blamed
for being victim of a crime and also influenced the degree to which a victim, who was
unrelated to the mimicry situation, was blamed: the more mimicry occurred, the less
victims were being blamed for the crime. Perpetrator blame, however, was unaffected
by mimicry. These results are the first to indicate that mimicry is related to victim
blaming and can possibly serve as a means to reduce victim blaming.
Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated that previous mimicry behavior is related to blaming a victim
that was either related or unrelated to the mimicry situation: the more participants
mimicked a person, the less they later blamed a victim for the crime. In Study 2, we
aimed to replicate and extend these results. In Study 2, we examined the causal
relationship between mimicry and victim blaming by instructing participants to
either mimic or not to mimic the person on the video. Thus, in this study participants
were instructed to mimic or not to mimic the movements of a person, after which
they were asked to judge related and unrelated victims and perpetrators of a crime.
Methods
Participants and Design
Participants were 39 students at Utrecht University (21 women and 18 men, mean
age: 22.23 years, range: 18–31 years). They participated for payment (€3) or course
credits. Our design was a 2 (mimicry instructions: mimicry vs. no mimicry) 9 2
(victim relatedness: related vs. unrelated) mixed participants-design. Mimicry was
varied between participants: participants were randomly assigned to either the
mimicry or the no mimicry conditions. Whether the victim was related or unrelated
to the person presented in the mimicry situation was varied within participants.
Procedure
The procedure was equal to that of Study 1, except that this time we manipulated the
amount of mimicry. The mimicry instructions were taken from Stel et al. (2009).
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Half of the participants received an instruction to mimic the movements of the
person on the video, while the other half received an instruction not to mimic the
movements. The instructions for both conditions were specific, guided by examples,
and were matched for content. Participants in both the conditions were asked to pay
attention to the movements of the person on the video. Participants in the mimicry
condition were instructed to imitate a movement immediately after having observed
a movement; participants in the no mimicry condition were instructed not to show
the same movements after having observed a movement. Previous studies showed
that these instructions are very effective (see, e.g., Stel et al., 2009), and in this study
we therefore did not record and code participants’ behaviors.
As in Study 1, after participants watched the video, they read the short
descriptions of the stimulus persons and the two scenarios. Again, one of the
scenarios was about the same student presented on the video which they previously
did or did not mimic; one of the scenarios was about a student who was unrelated to
the person presented on the video. As in Study 1, the order of crime type (rape or
assault first) and the order of the person described in the scenarios (related or
unrelated person first) was counterbalanced. Subsequently, participants filled out a
questionnaire measuring the degree to which participants blamed the victim
(a = .89) and perpetrator (a = .79) for what had happened. Finally, demographic
variables were assessed and all participants were asked if they knew what the
experiment was about. None of them reported anything related to the actual goals of
our study. Afterward participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
There were no effects of gender of the participant, crime type, and order of crime
type and person. Therefore, these variables were discarded from the analyses below.
A 2 (mimicry instructions: mimicry vs. no mimicry) 9 2 (victim relatedness:
related vs. unrelated) mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
with degree of victim blame as the dependent variable and with mimicry
instructions as between-participants variable and victim relatedness as within-
participants variable. Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and the
Table 1 Means and standard deviations of participants’ ratings of victim blame by mimicry instructions
and victim relatedness (Study 2)
Victim Mimicry instructions
Mimicry No mimicry
M SD M SD
Related 1.22a 0.28 1.56b 0.62
Unrelated 1.26a 0.52 1.81b 0.98
Note Means are on seven-point scales with higher scores indicating that participants blamed the victim
more for the crime. Means with noncommon subscripts differ significantly (p \ .05) within each column
and row
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results of relevant contrast tests. A main effect of mimicry instructions indicated
that participants who previously mimicked held victims less responsible for the
crime (M = 1.24, SD = 0.40) than participants who did not mimic (M = 1.69,
SD = 0.80), F(1, 37) = 6.46, p = .01, gp
2 = .15. There was no main effect of
victim relatedness, F(1, 37) = 1.55, p = .22, gp
2 = .04, nor an interaction effect
between mimicry and victim relatedness, F \ 1. Thus, the effects of mimicry were
not different for related or unrelated victims.
A 2 (mimicry instructions: mimicry vs. no mimicry) 9 2 (victim relatedness:
related vs. unrelated) mixed-design ANOVA using perpetrator blame as dependent
variable revealed no significant main or interaction effects, all Fs \ 1 (M = 4.93,
SD = 1.19).
Discussion
Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1, again revealing that mimicry is related to
victim blaming. More specifically, Study 2 showed that instructed mimicry led to
less victim blaming than instructed no mimicry. Furthermore, we showed that
effects of mimicry on blaming the victim, who was being mimicked or not, did not
differ from effects of mimicry on blaming the victim who was unrelated to the
person previously being mimicked or not. We elaborate on the implications of these
results in the ‘‘General Discussion’’. Finally, as in Study 1, mimicry was not related
to perpetrator blaming, suggesting that the effects of mimicry are specific for
reactions to stimulus persons with which one can empathize easily (e.g., victims)
and not with persons with which it is difficult to empathize (e.g., perpetrators).
General Discussion
Across two studies, we have revealed the existence of a relationship between
mimicry and victim blaming. In Study 1, we demonstrated that spontaneous
mimicry affected victim blaming: The more a person was mimicked, the less
victims were being blamed for what had happened. In Study 2, we showed that
when participants were instructed to mimic a person (compared to an instructed not
to mimic condition), they blamed victims of a crime less. The results were obtained
when the victim was the same person participants previously mimicked or not, and
also when the victim was unrelated to the mimicry situation.
Our findings have theoretical and practical implications. First, our studies
empirically showed that engaging in mimicry led to a decrease in the degree to
which victims were being blamed for their involvement in the crime. These findings
are especially interesting given people’s strong need to justify the way things are
and to justify what happens to them and other people, even when this means
derogating others (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Our findings have practical
implications as well. Our studies show how the chances can be reduced that a victim
becomes victimized twice. In addition to the harm caused by the primary
victimization, being blamed for what happened (secondary victimization) causes the
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victim to experience even more posttraumatic stress reactions and depression
symptoms (e.g., Campbell, Sefl, Barnes, Ahrens, Wasco, & Zaragoza-Diesfeld,
1999). The trauma may therefore extend far beyond the actual crime. The severity
of the victims’ trauma can be reduced when, for instance, police officers and people
close to the victim would mimic the victim, which reduces the chances that people
may engage in victim blaming. Because it is possible that when exposed to a person
knowing that she/he is victim of a crime, the tendency to spontaneously mimic the
victim might be reduced, we suggest intentionally mimicking the victim as an
important mechanism to reduce the level of blaming innocent victims. In other
words, we suggest police officers, therapists, and people related to the victim to
imitate the victims’ behaviors and expressions while talking to her/him to reduce the
victims’ trauma and to increase understanding for the victim.
A critic might argue that prior exposure to victims, for instance in justice settings,
might be limited. Our studies, however, suggest that previously having mimicked a
person unrelated to the crime also reduces victim blaming. People nonconsciously
mimic and are being mimicked continuously in everyday life, even when other
people are strangers (e.g., Bernieri, 1988; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Hsee, Hatfield,
Carlson, & Chemtob, 1990). Therefore, it is highly likely that people, right before
talking to a victim or being exposed to a victim in court, have engaged in mimicry
behavior. Thus, the experimental setting of our studies might be considered
artificial, but the mimicry mechanism revealed here may well generalize to the real
world. Future research is needed, of course, to examine this possible implication of
the current research findings.
The finding that victim blaming is also reduced when previously having
mimicked a person unrelated to any crime is in line with previous mimicry research.
The reduction in victim blaming does not seem to be the result of feelings for the
specific victim that change while mimicking the victim, but seems to be due to a
general mechanism. Previous mimicry research showed that when mimicking or
being mimicked, a general empathic mindset becomes activated, leading mimickers
to be more empathic toward other people in general (Ashton-James et al., 2007; Stel
et al., 2008; Van Baaren et al., 2004). These studies demonstrated that mimicry
makes people more oriented toward others and enhances prosocial behavior toward
others in general, irrespective of the object of mimicry. This general empathic
mindset can explain why, in this research, victims who are unrelated to the mimicry
situation are more positively judged and blamed less for their involvement in the
crime. Because, normally, people do not empathize with perpetrators, one would not
have expected judgments of perpetrators to be affected by mimicry. This line of
thought is in accordance with studies showing that mimicry does not increase
understanding for the emotions of the other person or liking for this other person
when people are not open to understand or like this person (Stel & Vonk, 2009; Stel,
Blascovich, et al., 2010). For instance, Stel, Blascovich, et al. (2010) demonstrated
that mimicry increases liking for others, except when a person is a priori disliked.
Therefore, we feel that it is not surprising that—although mimicry can elicit a
general empathic mindset, increasing the empathy felt for other people—people do
not feel more empathy for a perpetrator as most people are not open to feel empathy
toward perpetrators in the first place. Furthermore, the finding that mimicry did not
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affect perpetrator blaming shows that judgments of victims and perpetrators are not
inversely related, that is, less victim blaming did not result in more perpetrator
blaming. Moreover, this implies that the effects of mimicry on victim blaming are
not due to mimicry causing people to become more positive in their judgments in
general.
Conclusions
To conclude, this article presents a new way of reducing victim blaming: when
mimicking the victim or when previously having mimicked an unrelated person, the
chances of blaming an innocent victim are reduced significantly. Being blamed for
something terrible that happened to you is one of the worst things that can happen
and has a tremendous impact on the success of innocent victims in coping with the
primary victimization. As people mimic each other continuously in daily life, our
findings have an important additional value for our knowledge of processes that can
reduce peoples’ negative reactions to innocent victims. Whether or not the
expressions of other people will be spontaneously mimicked (as assessed in Study
1) depends on the kind of facial expressions that are being displayed, whether the
expressions are seen as real, whether people feel empathy and liking for the person
and whether the person is regarded as an in- or out-group member (e.g., Bourgeois
& Hess, 2008; Likowski, Mu¨hlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2008; Stel & Vonk,
2009; Stel, Van Baaren, et al., 2010). Thus, if the tendency to spontaneously mimic
is reduced, one can consciously mimic a victim as a means to reduce the chances of
this person becoming victimized twice. Furthermore, our results imply that when
previously having unconsciously mimicked—for instance, when sitting in the train,
when watching television, when listening to your colleagues’ presentation—the
likelihood of reacting negatively to a person whom you see becoming victim of a
crime or a person who tells you that she/he is assaulted, is reduced.
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